Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889—1951)

Ludwig WittgensteinLudwig Wittgenstein is 1 of the most influential philosophers of the twentieth century, and regarded past some as the nigh of import since Immanuel Kant. His early piece of work was influenced by that of Arthur Schopenhauer and, specially, by his teacher Bertrand Russell and by Gottlob Frege, who became something of a friend. This piece of work culminated in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, the only philosophy volume that Wittgenstein published during his lifetime. It claimed to solve all the major issues of philosophy and was held in particularly high esteem by the anti-metaphysical logical positivists. The Tractatus is based on the thought that philosophical problems arise from misunderstandings of the logic of linguistic communication, and it tries to show what this logic is. Wittgenstein'southward later on piece of work, principally his Philosophical Investigations, shares this business organization with logic and language, merely takes a different, less technical, approach to philosophical problems. This book helped to inspire and so-called ordinary language philosophy. This style of doing philosophy has fallen somewhat out of favor, but Wittgenstein'southward work on rule-following and private language is all the same considered important, and his afterward philosophy is influential in a growing number of fields exterior philosophy.

Table of Contents

  1. Life
  2. Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus
  3. Ethics and Organized religion
  4. Conception of Philosophy
  5. Meaning
  6. Rules and Private Language
  7. Realism and Anti-Realism
  8. Certainty
  9. Continuity
  10. Wittgenstein in History
  11. References and Further Reading
    1. Wittgenstein's Main Works
    2. Some Biographies of Wittgenstein
    3. Secondary Works

1. Life

Ludwig Josef Johann Wittgenstein, born on Apr 26th 1889 in Vienna, Austria, was a charismatic enigma. He has been something of a cult figure only shunned publicity and even congenital an isolated hut in Norway to live in complete seclusion. His sexuality was ambiguous but he was probably gay; how actively so is nonetheless a thing of controversy. His life seems to accept been dominated by an obsession with moral and philosophical perfection, summed up in the subtitle of Ray Monk'due south excellent biography Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius.

His concern with moral perfection led Wittgenstein at one indicate to insist on confessing to several people various sins, including that of allowing others to underestimate the extent of his 'Jewishness'. His father Karl Wittgenstein's parents were built-in Jewish but converted to Protestantism and his mother Leopoldine (nee Kalmus) was Cosmic, but her father was of Jewish descent. Wittgenstein himself was baptized in a Catholic church and was given a Catholic burial, although between baptism and burial he was neither a practicing nor a believing Catholic.

The Wittgenstein family was large and wealthy. Karl Wittgenstein was one of the most successful businessmen in the Austro-Hungarian Empire, leading the iron and steel industry there. The Wittgensteins' home attracted people of culture, especially musicians, including the composer Johannes Brahms, who was a friend of the family. Music remained important to Wittgenstein throughout his life. So did darker matters. Ludwig was the youngest of eight children, and of his iv brothers, three committed suicide.

As for his career, Wittgenstein studied mechanical technology in Berlin and in 1908 went to Manchester, England to practice research in aeronautics, experimenting with kites. His interest in engineering led to an interest in mathematics which in plough got him thinking about philosophical questions about the foundations of mathematics. He visited the mathematician and philosopher Gottlob Frege (1848-1925), who recommended that he study with Bertrand Russell (1872-1970) in Cambridge. At Cambridge Wittgenstein greatly impressed Russell and G.East. Moore (1873- 1958), and began work on logic.

When his father died in 1913 Wittgenstein inherited a fortune, which he speedily gave away. When war broke out the next year, he volunteered for the Austrian ground forces. He continued his philosophical work and won several medals for bravery during the war. The outcome of his thinking on logic was the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus which was eventually published in English language in 1922 with Russell's assist. This was the merely book Wittgenstein published during his lifetime. Having thus, in his stance, solved all the problems of philosophy, Wittgenstein became an elementary school teacher in rural Austria, where his arroyo was strict and unpopular, but plainly constructive. He spent 1926-28 meticulously designing and edifice an austere house in Vienna for his sister Gretl.

In 1929 he returned to Cambridge to teach at Trinity College, recognizing that in fact he had more work to do in philosophy. He became professor of philosophy at Cambridge in 1939. During Globe War Ii he worked as a infirmary porter in London and as a research technician in Newcastle. After the war he returned to university teaching but resigned his professorship in 1947 to concentrate on writing. Much of this he did in Ireland, preferring isolated rural places for his work. By 1949 he had written all the material that was published after his death as Philosophical Investigations, arguably his most important work. He spent the terminal 2 years of his life in Vienna, Oxford and Cambridge and kept working until he died of prostate cancer in Cambridge in April 1951. His work from these final years has been published every bit On Certainty. His concluding words were, "Tell them I've had a wonderful life."

2. Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus

Wittgenstein told Ludwig von Ficker that the point of the Tractatus was ethical. In the preface to the book he says that its value consists in two things: "that thoughts are expressed in information technology" and "that information technology shows how little is achieved when these problems are solved." The problems he refers to are the bug of philosophy defined, we may suppose, by the work of Frege and Russell, and maybe also Schopenhauer. At the end of the book Wittgenstein says "My propositions serve as elucidations in the following way: anyone who understands me eventually recognizes them as nonsensical" [emphasis added]. What to brand of the Tractatus, its author, and the propositions information technology contains, and so, is no like shooting fish in a barrel matter.

The book certainly does not seem to be nigh ethics. It consists of numbered propositions in seven sets. Proposition 1.2 belongs to the commencement set and is a annotate on suggestion one. Proposition 1.21 is about proposition one.two, and and then on. The seventh set contains simply one proposition, the famous "What we cannot speak virtually we must pass over in silence."

Some important and representative propositions from the book are these:

1 The earth is all that is the example.
4.01 A proposition is a picture of reality.
4.0312 …My central idea is that the 'logical constants' are not representatives; that at that place tin be no representatives of the logic of facts.
4.121 …Propositions testify the logical form of reality. They display it.
4.1212 What tin be shown, cannot be said.
4.five …The general form of a proposition is: This is how things stand.
5.43 …all the propositions of logic say the same thing, to wit nothing.
5.4711 To give the essence of a proposition ways to give the essence of all clarification, and thus the essence of the world.
v.6 The limits of my linguistic communication mean the limits of my earth.

Here and elsewhere in the Tractatus Wittgenstein seems to be saying that the essence of the world and of life is: This is how things are. One is tempted to add together "–bargain with it." That seems to fit what Cora Diamond has called his "take and endure" ideals, simply he says that the propositions of the Tractatus are meaningless, not profound insights, ethical or otherwise. What are we to make of this?

Many commentators ignore or dismiss what Wittgenstein said virtually his work and its aims, and instead look for regular philosophical theories in his work. The most famous of these in the Tractatus is the "picture theory" of meaning. According to this theory propositions are meaningful insofar every bit they motion-picture show states of affairs or matters of empirical fact. Anything normative, supernatural or (one might say) metaphysical must, information technology therefore seems, be nonsense. This has been an influential reading of parts of the Tractatus. Unfortunately, this reading leads to serious problems since by its ain lights the Tractatus' use of words like "object," "reality" and "globe" is illegitimate. These concepts are purely formal or a priori. A statement such every bit "In that location are objects in the world" does not motion picture a state of affairs. Rather it is, every bit information technology were, presupposed past the notion of a state of affairs. The "picture show theory" therefore denies sense to just the kind of statements of which the Tractatus is composed, to the framework supporting the moving picture theory itself. In this way the Tractatus pulls the rug out from under its own feet.

If the propositions of the Tractatus are nonsensical so they surely cannot put forward the film theory of significant, or any other theory. Nonsense is nonsense. However, this is not to say that the Tractatus itself is without value. Wittgenstein'southward aim seems to have been to show up as nonsense the things that philosophers (himself included) are tempted to say. Philosophical theories, he suggests, are attempts to answer questions that are not really questions at all (they are nonsense), or to solve problems that are not really problems. He says in proposition 4.003 that:

Well-nigh of the propositions and questions of philosophers arise from our failure to understand the logic of our language. (They vest to the aforementioned class as the question whether the adept is more than or less identical than the cute.) And it is not surprising that the deepest problems are in fact not bug at all.

Philosophers, then, accept the task of presenting the logic of our linguistic communication clearly. This will not solve important issues only it volition show that some things that we take to be of import bug are really non bug at all. The proceeds is not wisdom only an absence of defoliation. This is not a rejection of philosophy or logic. Wittgenstein took philosophical puzzlement very seriously indeed, but he thought that it needed dissolving past analysis rather than solving by the production of theories. The Tractatus presents itself equally a central for untying a series of knots both profound and highly technical.

3. Ethics and Religion

Wittgenstein had a lifelong interest in religion and claimed to meet every problem from a religious point of view, but never committed himself to any formal religion. His various remarks on ethics also advise a particular indicate of view, and Wittgenstein often spoke of ethics and faith together. This signal of view or attitude can be seen in the four principal themes that run through Wittgenstein's writings on ethics and religion: goodness, value or pregnant are not to be found in the world; living the right mode involves acceptance of or understanding with the world, or life, or God'south will, or fate; one who lives this way will see the world as a phenomenon; there is no answer to the problem of life–the solution is the disappearance of the problem.

Certainly Wittgenstein worried about beingness morally adept or even perfect, and he had great respect for sincere religious conviction, but he as well said, in his 1929 lecture on ethics, that "the tendency of all men who e'er tried to write or talk Ideals or Religion was to run against the boundaries of language," i.e. to talk or write nonsense. This gives support to the view that Wittgenstein believed in mystical truths that somehow cannot be expressed meaningfully just that are of the utmost importance. It is hard to conceive, though, what these 'truths' might be.

An alternative view is that Wittgenstein believed that at that place is really nada to say virtually ethics. This would explain why he wrote less and less nearly ethics every bit his life wore on. His "accept and endure" attitude and belief in going "the bloody hard mode" are evident in all his work, especially after the Tractatus. Wittgenstein wants his reader non to recollect (too much) just to look at the "linguistic communication games" (any practices that involve linguistic communication) that give rising to philosophical (personal, existential, spiritual) bug. His arroyo to such issues is painstaking, thorough, open-eyed and receptive. His ethical attitude is an integral part of his method and shows itself as such.

But in that location is little to say about such an attitude short of recommending information technology. In Culture and Value p.29e Wittgenstein writes:

Rules of life are dressed up in pictures. And these pictures can only serve to describe what we are to do, not justify information technology. Because they could provide a justification just if they held good in other respects as well. I tin say: "Give thanks these bees for their honey as though they were kind people who have prepared it for you"; that is intelligible and describes how I should like you lot to conduct yourself. But I cannot say: "Thank them because, wait, how kind they are!"–since the next moment they may sting you lot.

In a earth of contingency ane cannot testify that a particular mental attitude is the correct one to accept. If this suggests relativism, it should exist remembered that information technology too is just 1 more attitude or bespeak of view, and 1 without the rich tradition and accumulated wisdom, philosophical reasoning and personal feel of, say, orthodox Christianity or Judaism. Indeed crude relativism, the universal sentence that one cannot make universal judgements, is self- contradictory. Whether Wittgenstein's views suggest a more sophisticated form of relativism is some other matter, but the spirit of relativism seems far from Wittgenstein's conservatism and absolute intolerance of his own moral shortcomings. Compare the tolerance that motivates relativism with Wittgenstein's exclamation to Russell that he would adopt "past far" an organization defended to war and slavery to one defended to peace and freedom. (This exclamation, however, should not be taken literally: Wittgenstein was no war-monger and even recommended letting oneself be massacred rather than taking function in mitt-to-hand combat. It was apparently the complacency, and perhaps the self-righteousness, of Russell's liberal crusade that Wittgenstein objected to.)

With regard to religion, Wittgenstein is oftentimes considered a kind of Anti-Realist (see below for more on this). He opposed interpretations of religion that emphasize doctrine or philosophical arguments intended to bear witness God'southward existence, just was profoundly drawn to religious rituals and symbols, and considered becoming a priest. He likened the ritual of religion to a great gesture, as when one kisses a photograph. This is not based on the false belief that the person in the photograph will feel the osculation or return it, nor is it based on any other belief. Neither is the kiss just a substitute for a item phrase, like "I beloved you." Similar the buss, religious activeness does express an attitude, merely information technology is non just the expression of an mental attitude in the sense that several other forms of expression might practice just equally well. There might be no substitute that would practice. The same might be said of the whole language-game (or games) of organized religion, but this is a controversial bespeak. If religious utterances, such as "God exists," are treated equally gestures of a certain kind then this seems not to be treating them as literal statements. Many religious believers, including Wittgensteinian ones, would object strongly to this. At that place is room, though, for a good bargain of sophisticated disagreement about what it means to take a argument literally. For instance, Charles Taylor'due south view, roughly, is that the real is whatever will not go away. If we cannot reduce talk about God to annihilation else, or supervene upon it, or prove it false, then perchance God is as real equally anything else.

4. Conception of Philosophy

Wittgenstein'due south view of what philosophy is, or should be, changed niggling over his life. In the Tractatus he says at 4.111 that "philosophy is not ane of the natural sciences," and at 4.112 "Philosophy aims at the logical description of thoughts." Philosophy is not descriptive but elucidatory. Its aim is to articulate upward muddle and confusion. It follows that philosophers should non business themselves and then much with what is bodily, keeping upwards with the latest popularizations of science, say, which Wittgenstein despised. The philosopher's proper business organization is with what is possible, or rather with what is conceivable. This depends on our concepts and the means they fit together as seen in language. What is conceivable and what is not, what makes sense and what does not, depends on the rules of language, of grammar.

In Philosophical Investigations Sect. 90 Wittgenstein says:

Our investigation is a grammatical one. Such an investigation sheds lite on our trouble past clearing misunderstandings away. Misunderstandings concerning the utilise of words, caused, among other things, past certain analogies between the forms of expression in different regions of linguistic communication.

The similarities betwixt the sentences "I'll keep it in mind" and "I'll go on it in this box," for instance, (along with many others) tin lead ane to call up of the mind as a matter something like a box with contents of its ain. The nature of this box and its mental contents can and then seem very mysterious. Wittgenstein suggests that i way, at to the lowest degree, to bargain with such mysteries is to recollect the different things one says near minds, memories, thoughts and so on, in a diverseness of contexts.

What i says, or what people in general say, can change. Ways of life and uses of language change, so meanings change, but not utterly and instantaneously. Things shift and evolve, but rarely if always so drastically that nosotros lose all grip on meaning. Then there is no timeless essence of at to the lowest degree some and perhaps all concepts, but we still understand i another well enough almost of the time.

When nonsense is spoken or written, or when something but seems fishy, we can sniff information technology out. The road out of confusion tin be a long and difficult one, hence the need for abiding attention to item and particular examples rather than generalizations, which tend to be vague and therefore potentially misleading. The slower the route, the surer the prophylactic at the end of information technology. That is why Wittgenstein said that in philosophy the winner is the 1 who finishes final. Simply we cannot escape language or the confusions to which information technology gives ascension, except by dying. In the meantime, Wittgenstein offers four main methods to avert philosophical confusion, as described by Norman Malcolm: describing circumstances in which a seemingly problematic expression might really exist used in everyday life, comparing our employ of words with imaginary language games, imagining fictitious natural history, and explaining psychologically the temptation to use a sure expression inappropriately.

The circuitous, intertwined relationship between a language and the form of life that goes with information technology ways that issues arising from language cannot just be set bated–they infect our lives, making us alive in confusion. We might find our way back to the correct path, merely there is no guarantee that nosotros will never again stray. In this sense in that location tin can be no progress in philosophy.

In 1931 Wittgenstein described his task thus:

Language sets anybody the aforementioned traps; it is an immense network of easily attainable incorrect turnings. And so we sentinel ane human being after some other walking down the same paths and we know in advance where he will branch off, where walk straight on without noticing the side turning, etc. etc. What I take to do then is erect signposts at all the junctions where in that location are incorrect turnings so equally to assistance people past the danger points.

But such signposts are all that philosophy can offer and there is no certainty that they will be noticed or followed correctly. And nosotros should remember that a signpost belongs in the context of a particular problem expanse. Information technology might exist no help at all elsewhere, and should not exist treated as dogma. And so philosophy offers no truths, no theories, nothing exciting, but mainly reminders of what we all know. This is not a glamorous role, only it is difficult and important. Information technology requires an almost infinite chapters for taking pains (which is one definition of genius) and could have enormous implications for anyone who is drawn to philosophical contemplation or who is misled by bad philosophical theories. This applies not only to professional person philosophers simply to whatever people who stray into philosophical defoliation, perhaps not even realizing that their issues are philosophical and non, say, scientific.

v. Meaning

Sect. 43 of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations says that: "For a large form of cases–though not for all–in which we employ the word "meaning" it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the linguistic communication."

It is quite clear that hither Wittgenstein is not offering the general theory that "meaning is use," every bit he is sometimes interpreted as doing. The principal rival views that Wittgenstein warns confronting are that the pregnant of a word is some object that information technology names–in which case the pregnant of a word could be destroyed, stolen or locked away, which is nonsense–and that the pregnant of a word is some psychological feeling–in which case each user of a give-and-take could mean something unlike by information technology, having a different feeling, and advice would be difficult if not impossible.

Knowing the meaning of a word can involve knowing many things: to what objects the word refers (if any), whether it is slang or not, what lexical category it is, whether it carries overtones, and if so what kind they are, and then on. To know all this, or to know enough to get by, is to know the employ. And generally knowing the employ ways knowing the pregnant. Philosophical questions most consciousness, for case, then, should be responded to by looking at the various uses we make of the word "consciousness." Scientific investigations into the brain are not directly relevant to this inquiry (although they might be indirectly relevant if scientific discoveries led united states to change our utilise of such words). The pregnant of whatsoever discussion is a affair of what nosotros do with our language, not something hidden within anyone's mind or brain. This is not an set on on neuroscience. It is simply distinguishing philosophy (which is properly concerned with linguistic or conceptual analysis) from science (which is concerned with discovering facts).

1 exception to the meaning-is-utilise dominion of thumb is given in Philosophical Investigations Sect.561, where Wittgenstein says that "the word "is" is used with 2 dissimilar meanings (every bit the copula and as the sign of equality)" only that its pregnant is non its use. That is to say, "is" has non one complex employ (including both "Water is clear" and "Water is Water") and therefore one complex meaning, but 2 quite distinct uses and meanings. It is an blow that the same discussion has these 2 uses. Information technology is not an accident that we use the word "automobile" to refer to both Fords and Hondas. But what is adventitious and what is essential to a concept depends on u.s., on how we use it.

This is not completely capricious, all the same. Depending on ane'due south environment, one'south physical needs and desires, one's emotions, one's sensory capacities, and and then on, different concepts will exist more than natural or useful to ane. This is why "forms of life" are and then of import to Wittgenstein. What matters to you depends on how you live (and vice versa), and this shapes your experience. So if a panthera leo could speak, Wittgenstein says, we would non be able to empathise it. We might realize that "roar" meant zebra, or that "roar, roar" meant lame zebra, but nosotros would non understand lion ethics, politics, aesthetic taste, religion, sense of humor and such like, if lions take these things. We could non honestly say "I know what you mean" to a panthera leo. Understanding another involves empathy, which requires the kind of similarity that we only do not have with lions, and that many people exercise non have with other human being beings.

When a person says something what he or she means depends non simply on what is said but besides on the context in which it is said. Importance, point, meaning are given by the surround. Words, gestures, expressions come live, as it were, only within a language game, a culture, a form of life. If a motion-picture show, say, means something then information technology ways so to somebody. Its pregnant is not an objective property of the motion-picture show in the way that its size and shape are. The same goes of any mental picture. Hence Wittgenstein's remark that "If God had looked into our minds he would not have been able to see there whom we were speaking of." Any internal image would need interpretation. If I translate my thought as i of Hitler and God sees it equally Charlie Chaplin, who is right? Which of the ii famous contemporaries of Wittgenstein's I mean shows itself in the manner I conduct, the things I practise and say. It is in this that the use, the meaning, of my thought or mental pic lies. "The arrow points but in the awarding that a living existence makes of it."

6. Rules and Private Language

Without sharing certain attitudes towards the things around united states, without sharing a sense of relevance and responding in similar means, advice would exist incommunicable. It is of import, for case, that nearly all of the states concur nearly all the time on what colors things are. Such agreement is part of our concept of color, Wittgenstein suggests. Regularity of the use of such concepts and agreement in their application is part of language, not a logically necessary precondition of it. Nosotros cannot separate the life in which there is such understanding from our concept of color. Imagine a different form or way of life and you imagine a different linguistic communication with different concepts, unlike rules and a different logic.

This raises the question of the relation between language and forms or ways of life. For instance, could but 1 person take a language of his or her ain? To imagine an individual lone from birth is scarcely to imagine a form of life at all, but more like merely imagining a life- form. Moreover, language involves rules establishing sure linguistic practices. Rules of grammer limited the fact that it is our exercise to say this (e.g. "half by twelve") and non that (east.1000. "half to i"). Understanding is essential to such practices. Could a solitary individual, and so, engage in whatever practice, including linguistic ones? With whom could he or she agree? This is a controversial issue in the interpretation of Wittgenstein. Gordon Baker and P.Grand.Due south. Hacker hold that such a lonely man could speak his own language, follow his own rules, and so on, agreeing, over time, with himself in his judgements and behavior. Orthodoxy is against this interpretation, however.

Norman Malcolm has written that "If yous conceive of an individual who has been in solitude his whole life long, then you take cut away the groundwork of pedagogy, correction, acceptance–in curt, the circumstances in which a rule is given, enforced, and followed." Mere regularity of behavior does not constitute post-obit rules, whether they be rules of grammar or any other kind. A motorcar that never starts in common cold weather does not follow the rule "Don't kickoff when information technology's cold," nor does a songbird follow a rule in singing the same vocal every mean solar day. Whether a lone-from-nascency individual would ever practice annihilation that nosotros would properly call post-obit a rule is at least highly doubtful. How could he or she give himself or herself a rule to follow without language? And how could he or she get a language? Inventing one would involve inventing significant, as Rush Rhees has argued, and this sounds incoherent. (The most famous debate about this was between Rhees and A.J. Ayer. Unfortunately for Wittgenstein, Ayer is by and large considered to accept won.) Alternatively, peradventure the Crusoe-like figure just does behave, sound, etc. but like a native speaker of, say, English. But this is to imagine either a freakish automaton, non a human being existence, or else a miracle. In the example of a miracle, Wittgenstein says, it is significant that we imagine not just the pseudo- Crusoe merely likewise God. In the case of the automated speaker, we might adopt what Daniel Dennett calls an "intentional stance" towards him, calling what he does "speaking English," but he is obviously not doing what the residue of us English language-speakers–who learned the language, rather than being born speaking it, and who influence and are influenced by others in our use of the language–practise.

The contend about solitary individuals is sometimes referred to as the debate about "private language." Wittgenstein uses this expression in another context, however, to name a language that refers to private sensations. Such a private language past definition cannot exist understood by anyone other than its user (who alone knows the sensations to which it refers). Wittgenstein invites us to imagine a human who decides to write 'South' in his diary whenever he has a certain awareness. This awareness has no natural expression, and 'S' cannot be defined in words. The just gauge of whether 'S' is used correctly is the inventor of 'Due south'. The only benchmark of correctness is whether a sensation feels the aforementioned to him or her. There are no criteria for its being the aforementioned other than its seeming the aforementioned. So he writes 'S' when he feels similar it. He might as well be doodling. The then-called 'private linguistic communication' is no language at all. The point of this is not to evidence that a private language is impossible only to show that certain things one might want to say most linguistic communication are ultimately incoherent. If we really endeavour to picture a world of private objects (sensations) and inner acts of meaning and so on, we run across that what we picture show is either regular public language or incomprehensible behavior (the man might also quack equally say or write 'S').

This does not, equally has been declared, brand Wittgenstein a behaviorist. He does not deny the existence of sensations or experiences. Pains, tickles, itches, etc. are all part of human life, of course. At Philosophical Investigations Sect. 293 Wittgenstein says that "if we metaphrase the grammer of the expression of sensation on the model of 'object and designation' the object drops out of consideration as irrelevant." This suggests non that pains and then on are irrelevant simply that nosotros should not construe the grammar of the expression of sensation on the model of 'object and designation'. If we want to empathize a concept like pain we should not call up of a pain every bit a private object referred to somehow past the public word "pain." A hurting is not "a something," just as love, democracy and strength are not things, but information technology is no more "a goose egg" than they are either (run into Philosophical Investigations Sect. 304). Maxim this is hardly satisfactory, just there is no simple respond to the question "What is pain?" Wittgenstein offers not an answer but a kind of philosophical 'therapy' intended to clear abroad what can seem and so obscure. To judge the value of this therapy, the reader will merely take to read Wittgenstein's piece of work for herself.

The best known work on Wittgenstein's writings on this whole topic is Saul A. Kripke's Wittgenstein on Rules and Individual Language. Kripke is struck past the idea that anything might count as standing a series or post-obit a rule in the aforementioned manner. Information technology all depends on how the rule or serial is interpreted. And any rule for estimation volition itself exist subject to a variety of interpretations, and and then on. What counts as following a dominion correctly, then, is non determined somehow by the rule itself only by what the relevant linguistic community accepts as following the rule. So whether two plus two equals four depends non on some abstract, extra-homo rule of addition, but on what we, and specially the people nosotros appoint as experts, have. Truth conditions are replaced by assertability conditions. To put it crudely, what counts is not what is true or correct (in some sense independent of the customs of language users), but what you can go abroad with or go others to accept.

Kripke's theory is articulate and ingenious, and owes a lot to Wittgenstein, but is doubtful equally an interpretation of Wittgenstein. Kripke himself presents the statement not equally Wittgenstein's, nor every bit his own, only equally "Wittgenstein'due south argument as it struck Kripke" (Kripke p.5). That the argument is not Wittgenstein'southward is suggested by the fact that it is a theory, and Wittgenstein rejected philosophical theories, and by the fact that the argument relies heavily on the get-go sentence of Philosophical Investigations Sect. 201: "This was our paradox: no form of action could exist determined by a rule, because every course of action can exist made out to accord with the dominion." For Kripke'south theory equally a reading of Wittgenstein, it is not good that the very next paragraph begins, "It tin be seen that there is a misunderstanding here…" Still, information technology is no easy affair to run into just where Wittgenstein does diverge from the hybrid person oft referred to as 'Kripkenstein'. The cardinal perhaps lies afterwards in the same paragraph, where Wittgenstein writes that "there is a mode of grasping a rule which is non an estimation". Many scholars, notably Baker and Hacker, have gone to neat lengths to explicate why Kripke is mistaken. Since Kripke is so much easier to understand, i of the all-time ways into Wittgenstein's philosophy is to written report Kripke and his Wittgensteinian critics. At the very least, Kripke introduces his readers well to issues that were of great business organization to Wittgenstein and shows their importance.

vii. Realism and Anti-Realism

Wittgenstein's place in the debate about philosophical Realism and Anti-Realism is an interesting i. His emphasis on language and human behavior, practices, etc. makes him a prime candidate for Anti-Realism in many people's eyes. He has even been accused of linguistic idealism, the idea that language is the ultimate reality. The laws of physics, say, would by this theory just exist laws of language, the rules of the language game of physics. Anti-Realist scepticism of this kind has proved quite pop in the philosophy of science and in theology, every bit well every bit more generally in metaphysics and ideals.

On the other hand, there is a school of Wittgensteinian Realism, which is less well known. Wittgenstein'due south views on faith, for example, are often compared with those of Simone Weil, who was a Platonist of sorts. Sabina Lovibond argues for a kind of Wittgensteinian Realism in ethics in her Realism and Imagination in Ethics and the influence of Wittgenstein is clear in Raimond Gaita's Good and Evil: An Absolute Conception. However, 1 should not become too far with the idea of Wittgensteinian Realism. Lovibond, for instance, equates objectivity with intersubjectivity (universal agreement), then her Realism is of a controversial kind.

Both Realism and Anti-Realism, though, are theories, or schools of theories, and Wittgenstein explicitly rejects the advocacy of theories in philosophy. This does not testify that he skillful what he preached, simply it should give us break. Information technology is too worth noting that supporters of Wittgenstein often claim that he was neither a Realist nor an Anti-Realist, at least with regard to metaphysics. There is something straightforwardly unWittgensteinian about the Realist's belief that language/thought can be compared with reality and found to 'agree' with it. The Anti-Realist says that we could not become outside our idea or language (or form of life or language games) to compare the two. But Wittgenstein was concerned not with what we can or cannot practise, merely with what makes sense. If metaphysical Realism is incoherent so and so is its opposite. The nonsensical utterance "laubgefraub" is not to be contradicted by saying, "No, it is non the instance that laubgefraub," or "Laubgefraub is a logical impossibility." If Realism is truly incoherent, every bit Wittgenstein would say, so and so is Anti-Realism.

viii. Certainty

Wittgenstein's last writings were on the subject of certainty. He wrote in response to Thousand.E. Moore'southward attack on scepticism about the external earth. Moore had held upwards one hand, said "Hither is i hand," so held up his other hand and said "and here is some other." His betoken was that things outside the listen really do exist, nosotros know they do, and that no grounds for scepticism could be strong plenty to undermine this commonsense cognition.

Wittgenstein did non defend scepticism, simply questioned Moore's merits to know that he had two hands. Such 'knowledge' is non something that i is always taught, or finds out, or proves. It is more like a background against which we come to know other things. Wittgenstein compares this background to the bed of a river. This river bed provides the support, the context, in which claims to know various things have meaning. The bed itself is non something nosotros tin know or doubt. In normal circumstances no sane person doubts how many hands he or she has. But unusual circumstances tin occur and what was function of the river bed tin can shift and become part of the river. I might, for example, wake up dazed afterward a terrible accident and wonder whether my easily, which I cannot feel, are still there or not. This is quite unlike, though, from Descartes's pretended doubt as to whether he has a body at all. Such radical uncertainty is really not dubiousness at all, from Wittgenstein's point of view. And so it cannot exist dispelled by a proof that the body exists, equally Moore tried to do.

ix. Continuity

Wittgenstein is generally considered to have changed his thinking considerably over his philosophical career. His early work culminated in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus with its picture theory of language and mysticism, according to this view. Then there came a transitional middle menstruation when he first returned to philosophical work later on realizing that he had not solved all the problems of philosophy. This period led to his mature, later menses which gave us the Philosophical Investigations and On Certainty.

In that location certainly are marked changes in Wittgenstein's piece of work, but the differences between his early and late piece of work can be exaggerated. Two central discontinuities in his piece of work are these: whereas the Tractatus is concerned with the general course of the proposition, the full general nature of metaphysics, and and then on, in his later work Wittgenstein is very critical of "the craving for generality"; and, in the Tractatus Wittgenstein speaks of the central problems of philosophy, whereas the afterwards work treats no problems as central. Another obvious difference is in Wittgenstein's manner. The Tractatus is a carefully constructed ready of short propositions. The Investigations, though also consisting of numbered sections, is longer, less clearly organized and more than rambling, at to the lowest degree in advent. This reflects Wittgenstein'south rejection of the thought that there are simply a few central problems in philosophy, and his insistence on paying attention to item cases, going over the crude footing.

On the other mitt, the Tractatus itself says that its propositions are nonsense and thus, in a sense (not easy to sympathize), rejects itself. The fact that the afterwards work also criticizes the Tractatus is not, therefore, proof of aperture in Wittgenstein's work. The chief change may take been 1 of method and style. Problems are investigated one at a time, although many overlap. There is not a total-frontal assault on the problem or problems of philosophy. Otherwise, the Tractatus and the Philosophical Investigations attack much the aforementioned problems; they just do and so in different means.

ten. Wittgenstein in History

Wittgenstein's place in the history of philosophy is a peculiar i. His philosophical didactics was unconventional (going from engineering science to working commencement-mitt with one of the greatest philosophers of his twenty-four hour period in Bertrand Russell) and he seems never to have felt the need to go back and make a thorough study of the history of philosophy. He was interested in Plato, admired Leibniz, but was nearly influenced by the piece of work of Schopenhauer, Russell and Frege.

From Schopenhauer (maybe) Wittgenstein got his involvement in solipsism and in the ethical nature of the relation between the will and the earth. Schopenhauer'south saying that "The world is my idea," (from The World as Will and Idea) is echoed in such remarks as "The world is my world" (from Tractatus 5.62). What Wittgenstein ways here, where he also says that what the solipsist means is quite correct, merely that information technology cannot be said, is obscure and controversial. Some take taken him to mean that solipsism is true only for some reason cannot be expressed. H.O. Mounce, in his valuable Wittgenstein's Tractatus: An Introduction, says that this interpretation is surely incorrect. Mounce's view is that Wittgenstein holds solipsism itself to exist a confusion, only one that sometimes arises when one tries to express the fact that "I have a point of view on the globe which is without neighbours." (Mounce p.91) Wittgenstein was not a solipsist but he remained interested in solipsism and related bug of scepticism throughout his life.

Frege was a mathematician too every bit a logician. He was interested in questions of truth and falsehood, sense and reference (a stardom he made famous) and in the relation betwixt objects and concepts, propositions and thoughts. But his interest was in logic and mathematics exclusively, not in psychology or ethics. His great contribution to logic was to innovate various mathematical elements into formal logic, including quantification, functions, arguments (in the mathematical sense of something substituted for a variable in a function) and the value of a office. In logic this value, according to Frege, is always either the True or the False, hence the notion of truth-value. Both Frege and Russell wanted to show that mathematics is an extension of logic. Undoubtedly both men influenced Wittgenstein enormously, especially since he worked first-hand with Russell. Some measure out of their importance to him can be seen in the preface to the Tractatus, where Wittgenstein says that he is "indebted to Frege's keen works and to the writings of my friend Mr Bertrand Russell for much of the stimulation of my thoughts." For some insight into whether Frege or Russell had the greater influence i tin consider whether one would rather be recognized for his or her bang-up works or for simply existence a friend.

In turn Wittgenstein influenced twentieth century philosophy enormously. The Vienna Circle logical positivists were greatly impressed past what they establish in the Tractatus, especially the idea that logic and mathematics are analytic, the verifiability principle and the idea that philosophy is an activity aimed at description, not the discovery of facts. Wittgenstein, though, said that information technology was what is not in the Tractatus that matters most.

The other group of philosophers most obviously indebted to Wittgenstein is the ordinary language or Oxford school of thought. These thinkers were more interested in Wittgenstein'due south later work and its attention to grammar.

Wittgenstein is thus a doubly key effigy in the evolution and history of analytic philosophy, but he has become rather unfashionable because of his anti-theoretical, anti-scientism stance, because of the difficulty of his work, and possibly likewise because he has been petty understood. Similarities between Wittgenstein's piece of work and that of Derrida are now generating interest amid continental philosophers, and Wittgenstein may nevertheless prove to be a driving force behind the emerging postal service-analytic school of philosophy.

11. References and Further Reading

A full bibliographical guide to works by and on Wittgenstein would make full a whole volume, namely Wittgenstein: A Bibliographical Guide by Guido Frongia and Brian McGuinness (Basil Blackwell, Oxford 1990). Obviously this is already out of date. Instead of a complete guide, therefore, what follows is a list of some of Wittgenstein'southward master works, some of the best secondary fabric on his work, and a few other works chosen for their accessibility and amusement value, for want of a improve expression.

a. Wittgenstein's Main Works

  • Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, translated by D.F. Pears and B.F. McGuinness (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London 1961).
    • His early classic.
  • The Blue and Brown Books, (Basil Blackwell, Oxford 1969).
    • From his middle period, these are preliminary studies for his after piece of work.
  • Philosophical Investigations, translated by G.Eastward.Grand. Anscombe (Basil Blackwell, Oxford 1963).
    • His late classic.
  • On Certainty, edited past 1000.East.M. Anscombe and Yard.H. von Wright, translated past Denis Paul and G.Eastward.One thousand. Anscombe (Basil Blackwell, Oxford 1979).
    • Like many of Wittgenstein'south works, this was compiled later his death from notes he had made. In this case the notes come from the concluding year and a half of his life.Works of more than general involvement by Wittgenstein include these:
  • Civilisation and Value, translated past Peter Winch (Basil Blackwell, Oxford 1980).
    • These are notes from throughout Wittgenstein's life dealing with all kinds of topics hinted at by its title, including music, literature, philosophy, religion and the value of silliness.
  • Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Belief, edited by Cyril Barrett (Basil Blackwell, Oxford 1966).
    • For 'psychology' read 'Freud', otherwise the championship is caption plenty. Hilary Putnam has recommended the department on faith every bit a valuable introduction to Wittgenstein'due south philosophy as a whole.

b. Some Biographies of Wittgenstein

  • Ray Monk Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius (Jonathan Greatcoat, London 1990).
    • Full of enlightening detail.
  • Norman Malcolm Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Memoir (Oxford University Printing, Oxford and New York 1984).
    • Shorter and includes textile from G.H. von Wright besides. Two of the all-time books on the Tractatus are:
  • 1000.Due east.One thousand. Anscombe An Introduction to Wittgenstein's Tractatus (University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia 1971).
    • Emphasizes the importance of Frege and is notoriously hard
  • H.O. Mounce Wittgenstein's Tractatus: An Introduction (Basil Blackwell, Oxford 1981).
    • Lighter but more reader-friendly.

c. Secondary Works

A good rule of thumb for picking secondary textile on Wittgenstein is to trust Wittgenstein's ain judgement. He chose G.Due east.M. Anscombe, Blitz Rhees and G.H. von Wright to understand and deal with his unpublished writings afterwards his death. Anything past one of these people should be fairly reliable. More than contentiously, I would say that the best people writing on Wittgenstein today are James Conant and Cora Diamond. Other books referred to in the text above or of special notation are these:

  • O.M. Bouwsma Wittgenstein: Conversations 1949-1951, edited past J.L. Arts and crafts and Ronald E. Hustwit (Hackett, Indianapolis 1986).
    • A seemingly footling read slim volume that includes records of Wittgenstein's comments on such various and interesting topics as Descartes, utilitarianism and the word 'cheeseburger'.
  • Stanley Cavell The Claim of Reason: Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy (Oxford Academy Press, Oxford and New York 1979).
    • A long, rich, challenging classic.
  • Cora Diamond The Realistic Spirit: Wittgenstein, Philosophy, and the Mind (MIT, Cambridge, Massachusetts 1991).
    • A collection of essays of varying degrees of accessibility on Frege, Wittgenstein and ethics, united by their Wittgensteinian spirit.
  • Yard.O'C. Drury The Danger of Words (Thoemmes Press, Bristol, U.K. and Washington, D.C. 1996).
    • A classic, including discussions of problems in psychiatry and religion by a friend of Wittgenstein's.
  • Paul Engelmann Letters from Wittgenstein with a memoir (Basil Blackwell, Oxford 1967).
    • Includes discussions by Wittgenstein and his friend Engelmann on the Tractatus, religion, literature and culture.
  • Saul A. Kripke Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language (Harvard University Printing, Cambridge, Massachusetts 1982).
    • Encounter the department on rules and private language above.
  • Norman Malcolm Wittgenstein: Nothing is Subconscious (Basil Blackwell, Oxford 1986).
    • Ane of the all-time accounts of Wittgenstein'due south philosophy from the disreputable point of view that the Tractatus advanced theses which are then attacked in the later piece of work.
  • Norman Malcolm Wittgenstein: A Religious Point of View?, edited with a response past Peter Winch (Cornell University Printing, Ithaca, New York 1994).
    • Malcolm basically summarizes Wittgenstein's philosophy, as he understands information technology, with a special accent on religion. Winch and so responds, correcting Malcolm'southward account where necessary. The issue is a highly accessible composite overview of Wittgenstein's work from the religious betoken of view, which is how Wittgenstein himself said that he saw every trouble.

Author Data

Duncan J. Richter
Electronic mail: RICHTERDJ@vmi.edu
Virginia Military Plant
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